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ABSTRACT -Several counties of south-central and southeast Kan-
sas experienced floods in the first week of November 1998. The commu-
nities of Arkansas City and Augusta were among those most severely 
affected by these floods. This study is based primarily on a mail ques-
tionnaire survey of residents of these two communities, and it examines 
respondents' satisfaction with four emergency response measures em-
ployed by local officials and emergency management agencies before 
and during the flood event. The extent of external support victims re-
ceived and the level of their satisfaction with that support were also 
investigated. The analysis of the survey data shows that the emergency 
response efforts and the support victims received were rated poorly. 
Furthermore, the satisfaction scores differed significantly between re-
spondents from Arkansas City and those from Augusta. The findings 
suggest that the extent of damage and preparedness are directly associ-
ated with victims' satisfaction with emergency measures undertaken by 
emergency management agencies. The study further suggests that the 
respondents of Arkansas City were relatively more satisfied with emer-
gency measures than their counterparts in Augusta. Unlike in Arkansas 
City, city officials in Augusta had little time to prepare for the flooding. 
Hazard preparedness appears to be an important determinant of victims' 
satisfaction with emergency measures. 
KEY WORDS: emergency measures, external support, flash flood evacuation, 
flash flood watch, flash flood warning, floods, Kansas 
Introduction 
Thirteen counties of south-central and southeast Kansas experienced 
flash floods in November 1998. Flash floods occur within six hours of the 
rain event and are characterized by a sharp rise in the water level followed 
by a rapid recession (NOAA/FEMA/ARC 1992; Smith and Ward 1998). The 
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1998 flash floods in Kansas forced hundreds from their homes and caused 
over $37.8 million in damage, mostly in Butler, Cowley, and Sedgwick 
Counties (Paul 1999). Two dozen rivers and streams in the flood-affected 
counties flowed out of their banks on the first four days of November as a 
result of heavy rains that began on 30 October 1998. All 13 flood-affected 
counties were declared disaster areas by the state and three of them were 
later declared federal disaster areas by the president of the United States 
(Fig. 1). Butler, Cowley, and Sedgwick Counties, where more than 1,600 
homes were flooded, suffered the most damage. In Butler County alone, 
over 800 homes, including 230 mobile homes, were damaged. 
Several cities in the affected counties were inundated with flood wa-
ters, but Augusta in Butler County and Arkansas City in Cowley County 
suffered the most damage (Figure 1). The primary objective of this study is 
to examine residents' satisfaction with four emergency response measures 
employed by local officials and emergency management agencies in these 
two communities before and during the November 1998 flash flooding. The 
extent of external support victims received and the level of their satisfaction 
with that support are also investigated. Satisfaction levels are analyzed by 
community of residence, and by personal and/or household attributes of the 
respondents. The emergency measures considered are: the issuance of flood 
watches and flood warnings, evacuation, and other preventive measures 
such as sandbagging. 
Flash Flood Research in the United States 
Flash floods are localized extreme events and are characteristic of 
steep stream slopes and impervious urbanized areas (Tobin and Montz 
1994, 1997). Several factors contribute to flash flooding. The two key 
elements are intensity and duration of rainfall. Local atmospheric, topo-
graphic, and soil conditions, ground cover, and drainage basin characteris-
tics also play an important role. Flash floods can occur within a few minutes 
or hours of excessive rainfall, dam or levee failure, or sudden release of 
water held by an ice jam (Bryant 1991). They can roll boulders, tear out 
trees, and destroy buildings and bridges, and trigger catastrophic mud slides. 
Fast-moving water associated with flash floods can even float cars. 
Floods have been the most costly natural hazard in the United States in 
terms of deaths and loss of property and crops (Mileti 1999). Catastrophic 
floods have therefore received considerable attention from hazard research-
ers during the past several decades. Research on flood hazards in the United 
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Figure I. Location of the slUdy area in Kansas . Shaded gray counties were declared 
state and federal Disaster Areas. Counties in black were declared a Disaster Area by 
the state. 
States began with the pioneer work by White (1945) , which ultimately led to 
the development of human ecological approach to hazard study (White 
1974). While most flood deaths and damage in the country are due to flash 
flood s (see NOAA/FEMA/ARC 1992), the research on this phenomenon 
has started only in the late 19705. 
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Figure 2. A Flood map of Arkansas City, Kansas. 
of Arkansas City (Fig. 2). The floodwater started to recede from this and other 
parts of the city on 5 November 1998 (Arkansas City Traveler 1998). 
The southwestern part of Arkansas City was flooded because the Ar-
kansas River overflowed the dike, and an old levee near the river broke as 
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Figure 3. Flood readings on the Arkansas River and Walnut River, Arkansas City, 
31 October-S November 1998. 
a result of prolonged ex posure to high water (Fig. 2). There were several 
breaches and two si nkholes in the levee on the south side of the city. Under 
the new flood-protection plan, a new levee around the south side of Arkan-
sas City is to be completed by 2004. Had it been completed before the 1998 
flooding. it is likely that no areas in the southeast and southwestern parts of 
the city would have been inundated (Arkansas City Traveler 1998). 
Augusta, population 8,700, also experienced flooding from two rivers: 
the Whitewater and the Walnut, whose waters topped a 35-foot (10.67 m) 
levee surrounding the town. The Whitewater river from the west and the 
Wa ln ut River from the east converge immediately south of Augusta (Fig. 4). 
Both rivers reached a crest of about 37 feet (I 1.27 m) above river bottom, or 
16 feet (4.87 m) above their flood stages of 21 feet (6.4 m) early in the 
morning of 2 November 1998 as a result of heavy rainfall that started at 
night on 30 October 1998. Hours ahead of the crest, parts of Augusta were 
already submerged by floodwater. Nearly 600 homes and 90 businesses 
were devastated by this fla sh flood and flood-related damage is estimated in 
excess of $2 million (Manhattan Mercury 1998). 
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Floodwater entered Augusta at several locations and submerged parts 
of the city for about three days. The Whitewater River topped the levee on 
the southwest portion of the levee system and eventually eroded the levee 
from the inside. The central business di strict of the city was under 5 to 7 feel 
( 1.52 to 2.13 m) of water. More than 300 homes and 30 businesses were 
evacuated in Augusta. The Red Cross establi shed a shelter at the First 
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Christian Church where about 1,000 people took refuge for several days 
(Kansas State Collegian 1998). Like Arkansas City, Augusta experienced 
flooding in 1993 and 1995, but damage did not compare to that sustained in 
the 1998 flash flood event. Both Arkansas City and Augusta have been 
participating in the National Flood Insurance Program since the early-l 990s 
(Arkansas City Traveler 1998). 
Sources of Data. Analysis in this study is primarily based on a mail 
questionnaire survey conducted following the flash flood event, beginning 
in November 1998 and ending in March 1999. Relevant information was 
also collected through personal interviews with key personnel such as city 
officials, longtime city residents, and emergency management personnel. 
Assistant city managers of Arkansas City and Augusta provided maps of 
flood-affected areas, addresses of the flood victims, and other flood-related 
documents. Discussions and informal interviews with the managers and 
other key personnel were very useful in understanding and evaluating the 
emergency measures undertaken by both public and private agencies in the 
selected communities. 
Personal opinions regarding the emergency response measures and the 
recovery activities of the affected areas were collected through the ques-
tionnaire survey. In addition to inquiring about overall satisfaction level 
with the emergency measures and support received, the questionnaire also 
requested information about the extent of damage incurred by the flood, the 
amount of emergency assistance provided by various organizations, and any 
adjustments made at the household level. Respondents were also asked to 
provide other information such as flood insurance status as well as selected 
household and individual characteristics. 
According to the documents (City Office of Arkansas City 1998; City 
Office of Augusta 1998) provided by the city managers, there were 373 
households in the flood-affected areas of Arkansas City and 338 in Augusta. 
Nearly two-thirds of the families in affected areas of both cities experienced 
damage from the 1998 flood. Since this study seeks personal opinions of 
both victims and nonvictims of the affected areas, these two groups of 
people were included in the questionnaire survey. This dictated a large 
sample size, which was also necessary because a low response rate was 
anticipated. Daily newspapers in eastern Kansas had reported that not all 
flood victims planned to return to their homes soon and that several people 
had already migrated to other cities (see Arkansas City Traveler 1998; 
Manhattan Mercury 1998). 
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A sample size of 200 for Arkansas City and 180 for Augusta was selected. 
Respondents were randomly selected from the address list provided by the city 
officials. Distribution of the questionnaire through the mail began the 
last week of January 1999, and the survey ended in the last week of 
March 1999. Within a week of the initial mailing, about 25% of the 
questionnaires were returned uncompleted because no one now lived at 
the specified addresses and forwarding addresses were unavailable to 
the postal service. Additionally, the address list provided by city offi-
cials contained several errors. 
The return rate of incomplete questionnaires was 6% higher among 
mobile-home residents relative to occupants of single-family dwellings, 
duplexes, and multifamily apartment complexes. More mobile homes were 
affected by flash flooding in Augusta than in Arkansas City, thus the return 
rate of incomplete questionnaires was also 3% higher in Augusta than in 
Arkansas City. Since response rates do not differ significantly among differ-
ent occupant groups and between affected and nonaffected groups, a 
nonresponse bias is unlikely to affect the results of this study. A second 
mailing of the questionnaire was directed to those respondents who did not 
return their questionnaire by the specified date and was needed in order to 
obtain a reasonable number of samples for this study. The analysis in this 
study is based on 128 usable questionnaires: 70 from Arkansas City and 58 
from Augusta. 
Emergency Response Measures Selected. Four activities were consid-
ered under the category of emergency response measures: the issuance of 
flash flood watches, the issuance of flood warnings, evacuation, and other 
related emergency measures-such as sandbagging and construction of 
emergency dikes. The issuance of a flash flood watch indicates flash flood-
ing is possible within the designated watch area (NOAA/FEMA/ARC 1992). 
A flash flood watch usually alerts people in the area of concern and permits 
time for remedial activities such as moving furniture and valuables to higher 
floors of the home, and for preparing vehicles in case an evacuation order is 
issued (NDSU Extension Service 1999). After a flood watch is issued, 
people are advised to monitor TV and/or radio broadcasts for additional 
information, particularly the possibility of an upgrade of the watch to a 
flood warning. 
A flash flood warning is issued when a flash flood is occurring or will 
occur very soon in the area of concern (NOAA/FEMA/ARC 1992). Loss of 
life and damage can be greatly reduced if the warning is issued in a timely 
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manner. Local emergency managers and the National Weather Service 
through local television and radio stations have the authority to issue a 
flood warning and advise people whether to evacuate or not. If an evacua-
tion is ordered, people are advised to leave their homes as soon as possible 
and take refuge on higher ground away from rivers, streams, creeks, and 
storm drains. 
Respondents' satisfaction with each of the four selected measures was 
examined using a 1-5 Likert Scale, in which 1 reflects the greatest dissatis-
faction and 5 indicates the greatest level of satisfaction. A score of 3 infers 
that the respondent was neither particularly dissatisfied nor satisfied. The 
scale was also used to record the respondents' overall satisfaction level with 
emergency assistance received. 
Although emergency measures were initiated in both selected commu-
nities by city officials, and similar types of private and public agencies 
responded, a comparative approach is used to examine whether the re-
sponses of the communities differ from each other with respect to each of 
the four emergency measures as well as with external support. Available 
studies (e.g., Blaikie et al. 1994; Bolin and Stanford 1998) suggest that the 
ability of a city to undertake emergency measures in a timely manner 
depends on city resources, which in turn depend on size, level of develop-
ment, and location of the city. Small size, low level of development, and 
remote location are generally inversely related to the ability of a city to 
initiate adequate emergency measures. The two selected cities differ in 
location, size, and the level of development. They also differ with respect to 
time of onset and duration of the flood. Level of development is represented 
by variables such as annual income and level of education of the residents 
(Blaikie et al. 1994; Bolin and Stanford 1998). 
Available hazard literature suggests that the differences in satisfaction 
with emergency measures and external support are a function of income, 
educational level, age, gender (see Gruntfest 1977; Haas et al. 1977; Blaikie 
et al. 1994), residential status of respondents in terms of location within the 
100-year floodplain, past flood experience, and flood insurance status (see 
Tobin and Montz 1997; Mileti 1999). An average of all satisfaction scores of 
each respondent with the four emergency measures was. calculated and 
rounded to the nearest whole number. This grand average score also ranges 
from 1 to 5, with 5 indicating the most satisfied score. 
Chi-square tests of association were then used to test for differences 
between the satisfaction score and seven selected variables: annual income, 
educational level, age, gender, flood experience, flood insurance at the time 
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of flooding, and city of residence. Since flood insurance status and location 
of residence within the 100-year flood plain are highly related to each other 
(r = .78), only the former is considered. A similar approach is adopted to test 
for differences in level of satisfaction with support received and the 
aforementioned variables. 
Characteristics of the Respondents. Table 1 presents selected socio-
economic and demographic characteristics of the respondents. A majority 
(54.76%) of the respondents were female, and nearly 67% were married at 
the time of the survey. The age of the respondents ranged from 21 to 86, with 
a median age of 44. Forty-four percent of the respondents belonged to the 
30-44 age group, and the age group labeled under 30 accounted for nearly 
25% of all respondents. Nearly half of the respondents had a high school 
diploma and nearly one-fourth had an undergraduate degree; one-sixth of 
all respondents had a graduate degree. 
Nearly 44% of the respondents were employed full-time at the time of 
the survey. Another 12% reported part-time employment. Some 27% of all 
respondents were retired and 17% were grouped under the "others" cat-
egory, which included the unemployed, students, the disabled, and home-
makers. The unemployment rate was very low in the study area. The modal 
gross family income was between $20,000 and $39,999 per year. Only 10% 
of the respondent households had a yearly income higher than $59,999, and 
31 % earned less than $20,000 annually. 
Table 1 further shows that among all the respondents, 92 (71.88%) 
directly experienced flooding in 1998. This means that their homes were 
inundated and the flood caused damage to their property and belongings. 
The homes of the remaining 36 respondents (18.13%) were not flooded, but 
many of them reported that floodwater came very close to their homes. Only 
17% of the respondents had flood insurance at the time of this flash flood 
event. 
Among the eight socioeconomic and demographic characteristics re-
ported in Table 1, five differ statistically between the two selected cities. 
They are: gender, age, education, income, and flood experience. While a 
majority of the respondents in Arkansas City were male, female respondents 
outnumbered male respondents in Augusta. Arkansas City respondents were 
younger in general and tended to have an elementary education relative to 
those from Augusta. The number of respondents who experienced flooding 
also differs between the two study sites (Table 1). Slightly over 83% of the 
Augusta respondents reported experiencing the flood compared with 62% 
for the respondents from Arkansas City. 
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TABLE 1 
SELECTED CHARACTERISTICS OF RESPONDENTS BY STUDY COMMUNITY 
Number of respondents (%) Total 
Characteristics Arkansas City Augusta number' (%) 
Gender 
Male 40 (58.82) 17 (29.31) 57 (45.24) 
Female 28 (41.18) 41 (70.69) 69 (54.76) 
X2 = 11.006 (d.f. = l;p = 0.001) 
Marital status 
Single II (16.18) 7 (11.86) 18 (14.17) 
Married 45 (66.18) 40 (67.80) 85 (66.93) 
Divorced 7 (10.29) 6 (10.17) 13 (10.24) 
Widowed 5 (7.35) 6 (10.17) 11 (8.66) 
X' = 0.717 (d.f. = 3;p = 0.869) 
Age (years) 
<30 23 (40.35) 4 (7.69) 27 (24.77) 
30-44 25 (43.23) 23 (44.23) 48 (44.04) 
45-64 4 (7.02) 15 (28.85) 19 (17.43) 
>64 5 (8.77) 10 (19.23) 15 (13.76) 
X' = 21.304 (d.f. = 3;p = 0.001) 
Education (highest level completed) 
Grade school 9 (13.24) I (1.72) 10 (7.94) 
High school 32 (47.06) 28 (48.28) 60 (47.62) 
Undergraduate 12 (17.65) 19 (32.76) 31 (24.60) 
Graduate 9 (13.43) 9 (15.52) 18 (14.40) 
Postgraduate" 5 (7.46) 1 (1.72) 6 (4.80) 
X' = 8.507 (d.f. = 3; p = 0.037) 
Employment 
Employed full-time 26 (41.94) 27 (45.76) 53 (43.80) 
Employed part-time 4 (6.45) 10 (16.95) 14 (11.57) 
Retired 20 (32.26) 13 (22.03) 33 (27.27) 
Others 12 (19.35) 9 (15.26) 21 (17.36) 
X' = 4.432 (d.f. = 3; P = 0.218) 
Income 
<$20,000 23 (40.35) 13 (22.41) 36 (31.30) 
$20,000-39,999 25 (43.86) 26 (44.83) 51 (44.35) 
$40,000-59,999 5 (8.77) 11 (18.97) 16 (13.91) 
>$59,999b 4 (7.02) 8 (13.79) 12 (10.43) 
X2 = 6.373 (d.f. = 3; P = 0.037) 
1998 flood experience 
Yes 42 (61.76) 50 (83.33) 92 (71.88) 
No 26 (38.24) 10 (16.67) 36 (28.13) 
X2 = 7.335 (d.f. = 1; p = 0.007) 
Flood insurance at the time of flooding 
Yes 14 (22.58) 5 (24.59) 29 (23.58) 
No 48 (77.42) 46 (75.41) 94 (76.42) 
X2 = 0.007 (d.f. = I; p = 0.935) 
Note: X2 = chi-square value, d.f. = degrees of freedom, and p = probability value. 
'Not all respondents provided all personal iriformation asked in the questionnaire and thus 
the number of responses will differ from one characteristic to another. 
"Merged with "Graduate" category to calculate chi-square value. 
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Results 
Eighty-two (89.13%) of the 92 respondents who experienced flash 
flooding supplied a list of items damaged by the flood; 77 of them reported 
the amount of loss caused by the flood. Damage estimates provided by 
respondents amounted to a total of about $2.24 million; this figure repre-
sents an average loss of $29,000 per respondent. The reported extent of 
damage caused by the flood differs remarkably between the two study 
communities. Average flood damage, in monetary terms, was much higher 
for the respondents in Augusta ($41,000) compared to those in Arkansas 
City ($14,000). 
As mentioned earlier, four emergency response measures were consid-
ered in this study. Respondents' satisfaction with these measures individu-
ally and collectively is examined in the following sections. 
Flash Flood Watch. The flood watch was issued by the National 
Weather Service at 9:00 a.m. and 1 :00 p.m. in Augusta and Arkansas City, 
respectively, on 1 November 1998. Respondents' satisfaction level with 
flood watch is presented in Table 2. It appears that 122 (95.31 %) of the 128 
respondents expressed their level of satisfaction with the flood watch. Sixty-
two (50.82%) of them were very dissatisfied, while only six (4.9%) respon-
dents were very satisfied with the flood watch alerts (Table 2). Importantly, 
88 (72.13%) of the 122 respondents believed that either there was no flood 
watch issued in their neighborhoods or one was not issued in a timely 
manner. This might be one reason for the high level of dissatisfaction 
reported for the flood watch component of the emergency measures consid-
ered in this study. 
Irrespective of their flood experience, all respondents were asked to 
rate their overall satisfaction level with the flood watches. The results 
suggest that the severity of flooding was negatively related to the satisfac-
tion level of the respondents. Augusta was more severely affected by the 
flash flooding in 1998 than Arkansas City. The flood occurred more rapidly 
and stayed longer in Augusta than Arkansas City. Additionally, the field 
survey reveals that the city authorities of Augusta had little time to prepare 
for the imminent flooding. The waters inundated the community so sud-
denly and unexpectedly that authorities had little time for advance warn-
ings. In the words of a respondent: "Everything happened fast-the levee 
broke fast, the water came fast, and rose fast." 
For the above reasons, satisfaction is lower for the respondents from 
Augusta than for respondents from Arkansas City (Table 2). The chi-square 
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TABLE 2 
RESPONDENT SATISFACTION LEVEL WITH SELECTED EMERGENCY 
RESPONSE MEASURES 
Other 
Satisfaction Flood Flood Flood emergency All 
level watch warnings evacuation measures measures 
1 62 71 54 42 26 
2 17 15 20 15 41 
3 25 15 25 27 26 
4 12 15 17 21 16 
5 6 6 6 17 2 
Total 122a 122 122 122 111 b 
Average score 
Study area 2.04 1.93 2.19 2.64 2.34 
Arkansas City 2.38 2.24 2.35 2.81 2.61 
Augusta 1.64 1.57 2.00 2.45 2.00 
x2-value 12.063 7.416 2.892 2.519 9.417 
(d.f.Jp) (3/0.007) (3/0.060) (3/0.409) (4/0.640) (3/0.024) 
a122 of the 128 respondents expressed their satisfaction level with the four selected 
emergency measures considered in this study. But not the same 122 respondents ex-
pressed their satisfaction level with each one of the selected measures. 
bOnly 111 respondents expressed their satisfaction level with all four selected emer-
gency measures. 
test demonstrated a highly significant difference between respondents of 
these two cities with respect to the overall satisfaction level with the flood 
watch alert. In Table 2, respondent satisfaction levels are not disaggregated 
by study site because, with the exception of the flood watch alert, the 
remaining measures did not differ significantly between the two study sites 
(Table 2). 
Flash Flood Warning. In addition to the dissemination of flood warn-
ings through TV and radio, police, fire department, and civil defense per-
sonnel delivered flood warning bulletins and flyers to residents of several 
low-lying areas in both Arkansas City and Augusta. The dissemination 
began at 2:30 p.m. in Augusta on I November 1998 and and 3:00 p.m. in 
Arkansas City on the following day. Nearly three-fourths of the respondents 
surveyed were not pleased with the flood warning component of the emer-
gency response measures considered in this study. Of the 122 respondents 
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who did rate their satisfaction level, 71 (58.20%) were very dissatisfied, 
while only six respondents (4.92%) were very satisfied with the flood 
warning (Table 2). The average satisfaction score for the flood warning is 
1.93, signifying that the respondents of both cities were displeased. Similar 
to the response for flood watches, the average level of satisfaction with 
flood warnings was higher for the respondents from Arkansas City than 
those from Augusta; however, the difference was not statistically significant 
at the p < 0.05 level (Table 2). 
Several respondents from Arkansas City claimed that the city authori-
ties knew several hours in advance that certain parts of the city were going 
to be flooded, but deliberately informed people that they had nothing to 
worry about in order to avoid creating a panic situation. Nearly three-
fourths of the respondents in both communities studied reported that there 
was no flood warning in their area or it was not delivered in a timely manner. 
Several respondents from Augusta reported that they called the city office 
and the local radio station during the evening hours of 1 November 1998 
regarding flood warnings but did not receive any useful information from 
them. Conversely, a considerable number of respondents in both cities 
ignored the warnings that were issued and did nothing to safeguard their 
property and belongings. All of them were very dissatisfied with the flood 
warning component of the emergency measures considered in this study. 
A number of respondents in both cities saw police or other city offi-
cials in the vicinity, but these personnel did not instruct anyone to leave the 
area nor was instruction given about what to do in the event of flash flooding 
or where to go for shelter. Several respondents acknowledged receiving a 
flood warning, but felt that their houses were far enough from the f1ood-
prone areas that they did not take any action. An overwhelming majority of 
the respondents thought that authorities of both cities failed to caution 
residents regarding the flash flooding. Some respondents from Augusta 
suggested that if the fire or tornado siren had sounded, more people would 
have been alerted. But Augusta city policy is to activate the storm sirens 
only in the case of a tornado, and if the city would have sounded the siren, 
some residents in the affected areas may have gone into their basements and 
may not have been able to get out. 
Flash Flood Evacuation. The evacuation of people from flood-af-
fected areas started about 11 :30 pm on 1 November 1998 in Augusta and in 
the early morning hours on 3 November 1998 in Arkansas City. Rescue 
teams evacuated families from their homes by boats in both cities and 
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victims were taken to flood shelters set up at two churches by the American 
Red Cross-one in Arkansas City and the other in Augusta. Nearly one 
dozen organizations including the Red Cross, the Salvation Army, the Lions 
Club, area churches, city police, the fire department, and the Army National 
Guard were involved in the flood evacuation process. Friends and relatives 
also helped many respondents evacuate their property. 
The questionnaire survey shows that of the 128 respondents, 105 
(82.03%) had to evacuate their homes as a result of the flooding. The 
evacuation rate was nearly 10% higher among the respondents in Augusta 
compared to those in Arkansas City. All the respondents who evacuated 
their residences were asked about the location and nature of their temporary 
accommodations. As has been found in previous studies (e.g., O'Brien and 
Payne 1997; Mileti et al. 1992; Dymon 1999), friends and relatives were the 
major source of the temporary accommodations provided for evacuees of 
both cities. Fifty-nine respondents (56.19%) stayed and/or were still staying 
with friends and relatives at the time of the survey. Twenty evacuees found 
accommodations with their parents or other family members and nineteen 
stayed in motels. Only 10 respondents stayed in flood shelters; the remain-
ing respondents lived in rented apartments or in trailer parks. Most of the 
evacuees stayed within a five-mile radius of their homes. Nearly half of the 
respondents who stayed in motels and flood shelters were there for several 
days before moving in with friends and relatives or to rented apartments. 
The survey indicates that respondents who evacuated their property 
lived on average about 20 days outside their homes. Eighty-four (80%) of 
the 105 respondents who were required to evacuate stayed elsewhere before 
returning to their homes. While away, these respondents returned periodi-
cally to repair their damaged homes. Of the evacuees, 10 respondents were 
still living with their friends or relatives at the time of questionnaire survey. 
The average length of stay outside the home was six days longer for the 
respondents from Augusta than those from Arkansas City. 
Irrespective of flood experience and evacuation status, all respondents 
were asked to express their satisfaction with the flood evacuation efforts 
using the five-point Likert Scale. The average score was 2.19, indicating 
that a majority of respondents from both sites were generally dissatisfied 
with the way the two selected cities handled the evacuation (Table 2). 
Specifically, respondents from Augusta were more dissatisfied with evacu-
ation measures than those from Arkansas City. Nearly two-thirds of all 
respondents indicated that the flood evacuation was not as effectively ex-
ecuted by authorities as it could have been. Ten respondents evacuated 
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themselves after their friends told them that the dike had broken. Three 
respondents evacuated their mobile homes because the gas line was discon-
nected by the gas company. Most respondents, however, expressed general 
satisfaction with evacuation efforts undertaken by the Red Cross, Salvation 
Army, and area churches. 
Other Emergency Measures. Other emergency measures undertaken 
by various organizations before and/or during the flooding included sand-
bagging, traffic control, and food distribution to flood victims. In addition 
to the various emergency management agencies and city departments, area 
churches, local and national voluntary organizations, and local businesses 
participated in these emergency measures as did individual residents of 
Arkansas City, Augusta, and neighboring communities. 
The survey indicates that nearly 25% of all respondents participated in 
other emergency measures. Several respondents wrote that they could not 
participate because they were preoccupied with saving their belongings, 
while others had no time to do so. Although no statistically significant 
variation was observed with respect to participation in other emergency 
measures between the respondents of the two selected cities, the survey data 
show that the participation rate was slightly higher among the respondents 
who did not experience flooding compared to those who did. 
Levees were constructed along the two rivers passing through Arkan-
sas City and Augusta to protect these cities from flooding. While undertak-
ing emergency response measures, city officials in Arkansas City feared that 
floodwater might top the levees at several points and they also identified 
weak spots on the levees where breaching might occur. It was then deemed 
necessary to raise the height of levees and enhance the strength of the levees 
in several places. City personnel in Arkansas City and others participated in 
filling sandbags and stacking them on levees. The National Guard was 
mobilized to aid in the levee work in both cities and approximately 40 
members of the nearby Winfield Correctional Facility were also utilized in 
Arkansas City. Many individuals also attempted to protect their residences 
by constructing sandbag diversions. 
City authorities in Augusta were not aware of any threat that floodwa-
ters would top the levee because they relied upon the information provided 
to them by the National Weather Service. The information stated that the 
crest would be several feet below the top of the levee and would occur 24 
hours later. It actually topped the levee by two feet and crested 18 hours 
earlier than predicted. As for identifying weak spots in the levee, city 
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officials claimed that there was never a concern that the levee would fail. 
After it was topped at the south end, their concern was that it would top at 
other points around the community. City personnel in Augusta did fill 
sandbags and place them in strategic locations, but not on levee tops, for 
additional protection. 
All areas of Arkansas City and Augusta that were already flooded or 
had a high potential for flooding were blocked to traffic, and many roads 
into these two towns had to be closed for several days because of the high 
water. Individual volunteers and the National Guard were employed to help 
divert traffic from flooded and/or flood-prone areas. The latter also helped 
to patrol the dike to check for breaches or seepage and to protect evacuated 
property. 
The average satisfaction level with other emergency measures is less 
than three, indicating that the respondents as a group were less than satisfied 
(Table 2). Respondents indicated that the other emergency measures under-
taken were less than adequate and not initiated in a timely manner. Among 
the four emergency measures considered in this study, the category of other 
emergency measures received the highest average satisfaction rating, fol-
lowed by flood evacuation, flash flood watches, and flash flood warning. 
However, all the scores remain below three, which suggests that respon-
dents in general were not satisfied with the measures taken. 
The average overall satisfaction scores of all four emergency measures 
considered in this study are calculated for seven selected respondent char-
acteristics: annual income, educational level, age, gender, flood experience, 
flood insurance status at the time of flooding, and community of residence. 
But the score differs statistically only in the case of the last variable. For this 
reason, Table 2 presents satisfaction scores only by study sites. Respondents 
in Arkansas City were more satisfied compared to their counterparts in 
Augusta, but the average score for both communities is less than three, 
indicating that respondents were less than satisfied with the performance of 
city officials and emergency response agencies as a result of the flood of 
November 1998. 
One important reason for widespread dissatisfaction with emergency 
response efforts in the study area was that respondents did not expect any 
flooding to occur, and most city residents were not prepared for it. The 
reason, in part, was that the levees generated a false sense of security in 
residents, and many perceived that the threat of flooding had been elimi-
nated through construction of the levees. Unfortunately, some of the levees 
were over 40 years old, and a considerable number of respondents from both 
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study sites complained that many levees were not properly maintained. City 
officials in both selected cities, however, denied this complaint. 
All indicators, including extent of damage incurred, evacuation rate, 
and length of stay outside damaged homes, suggest that Augusta suffered 
more from the November 18 flash flood than Arkansas City. City officials in 
Augusta had little time to prepare for the flooding, but city authorities in 
Arkansas City had 24 to 36 hours to organize emergency response plans. 
Arkansas City is located about 50 miles (75 km) directly south of Augusta. 
Both cities were flooded by two rivers; one of them (the Walnut River) was 
a source of flooding for both cities. City officials in Arkansas City closely 
monitored the water level of the Arkansas and Walnut Rivers. They report-
edly contacted a majority of the residents in the I OO-year floodplain as well 
as some residents in other parts of the city and warned them in advance. 
Since Arkansas City is larger than Augusta, it has more manpower to 
implement emergency measures relatively quickly and efficiently than Au-
gusta. The size of city seems to be positively associated with satisfaction 
level. and the amount of flood damage experienced by respondents appears 
negatively associated with satisfaction level. Per capita losses in Augusta 
were about three times higher than in Arkansas City. Additionally, the 
number of respondents who experienced flooding was significantly higher 
in Augusta than in Arkansas City. All these may help explain why the 
average overall satisfaction scores statistically differed among the respon-
dents of the two selected cities. 
External Support Received and Level of Satisfaction with the Support. 
Analysis of the survey data reveals that 81 (88.04%) of the 92 respondents 
who experienced flooding received support, often from multiple sources. 
The largest number of flood victims (92%) obtained support from volunteer 
organizations, followed by government disaster programs (78%). The re-
maining three sources (insurance, business, and others) provided support to 
less 20% of all respondents. The satisfaction rankings of these three sources 
differ between the two study sites (Table 3). 
Among volunteer organizations, the Red Cross, Salvation Army, and 
area churches played a dominant role in providing support for flood victims 
in both cities. Respondents also received support from several government 
disaster programs, and the Federal Emergency Management Agency and 
Small Business Adminstration actively participated in distributing emer-
gency assistance among flood victims. To make it easier for flood victims to 
obtain information and help, the Federal Emergency Management Agency 
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TABLE 3 
RESPONDENT SATISFACTION LEVEL WITH EXTERNAL SUPPORT 
Satisfaction 
Level Arkansas City Augusta Total 
I (very dissatisfied) 4 10 14 
2 (dissatisfied) 1" 11 12 
3 (neither satisfied nor 15 10 25 
dissatisfied) 
4 (satisfied) 8 9 17 
5 (very satisfied) 7 9 16 
Total 35 49 84b 
Average score 3.29 2.91 3.07 
x'-value 9.074 (d.f. = 3; p = 0.028) 
"Merged with satisfaction level I to calculate the chi-square value. 
b Among 92 respondents who experienced flood damage, 84 received external support. 
and the Kansas Division of Emergency Management established a Disaster 
Recovery Center in Augusta. 
The type of support received by flood victims included cash, checks, 
low interest loans, credit utilities, food, cleaning supplies, furniture, rental 
assistance, and clothing. Additionally, the Red Cross and Salvation Army 
provided flood victims with vouchers to purchase clothing, food, and other 
items to meet emergency needs. Often disaster victims suffer from depres-
sion and stress for many days following an event, yet not a single respondent 
indicated they had received counseling. Three respondents, however, re-
ported that their children had a difficult time after the flooding because the 
flood damaged their toys. The assistant city manager of Augusta claimed 
that many physicians and churches notified the city that they were willing to 
provide counseling to the community. City staff members did a followup 
inquiry on the amount of counseling provided to victims and, surprisingly, 
very little assistance was requested. 
When expressed as a dollar value, all support received by the respon-
dents totaled about $590,000, which represents only 26% of the total dam-
age reported by the respondents. In Arkansas City the actual monetary 
support received was only 23% of the amount of damage reported by the 
respondents; Augusta received 28%. Respondents in Augusta suffered more 
damage from the flooding and consequently received greater support in 
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terms of monetary value than respondents in Arkansas City. But the ratios of 
aid to losses are similar in both communities. Note that all respondents who 
experienced flood damage did not report the amount of support received; 
therefore, the actual amount of support received is likely higher than the 
reported amount. 
Government sources rank first with respect to amount of support 
provided to the flood victims, accounting for slightly over 64% of all 
support received, followed by insurance companies, volunteer organiza-
tions, businesses, and other sources. As noted earlier, volunteer organiza-
tions provided support to the largest number of victims, yet these 
organizations as a group rank third behind government sources and insur-
ance companies in terms of value of the support offered (Fig. 5A). 
Ranking and relative contribution by the four broad sources of support 
considered in this study differ between the two study sites. In Arkansas City, 
government emergency agencies provided as much as 81.6% of the total 
value of all support received, but in Augusta only 60.16% (Fig. 5B and 5C). 
The contributions of insurance agencies, business firms, and other groups as 
sources of support to flood victims was lower in the Arkansas City relative 
to Augusta. This may explain why government sources provided a higher 
proportion of support to the respondents of Arkansas City than those of 
Augusta. 
Many respondents thought that the compensation they received for 
reported losses was inadequate. As noted earlier, the various sources of 
support were able to compensate only 26% of the total reported losses. For 
this reason, flood victims had to make adjustments to their household 
income level to compensate for damages caused by the flood. As many as 61 
(66.3%) of the 92 respondents sold belongings, property, or spent previous 
savings to mitigate flood damage. A number of respondents also borrowed 
money from their friends and close relatives, and several respondents used 
credit cards to defray expenses. This finding is consistent with existing 
literature which suggests that victims bear the major share of losses caused 
by a natural disaster and they aid themselves in coping with extreme events 
(see White 1974; Burton et al. 1978; Smith1992; Hewitt 1997). 
Typical of most natural disasters, some discontent was found with the 
official response to this flash flood event (see Tobin and Montz 1994). As 
many as 26 respondents expressed dissatisfaction with the services pro-
vided by FEMA. Specifically, most complained that it was hard to contact 
FEMA personnel. They further criticized the slowness of the process re-
quired to receive payments and the incredible amount of documentation 
required. Several respondents directed animosity in their remarks at Red 
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Figure 5. The percentage contribution of major sources to the total amount of 
support received by respondents. 
Cross personnel. In contrast, many flood victims stated great appreciation 
for the assistance provided by the Salvation Army and area ch urches. 
Respondents were asked to rate the overall sat isfaction level with the 
support they received from external sources. The level of satisfaction sig-
nificantly differed only in the case of the community of resi dence. Of the 84 
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respondents who rated their satisfaction level, 25 (29.76%) were neither 
satisfied nor dissatisfied (Table 3). Thirty-three respondents (39.29%) were 
either satisfied or very satisfied, while 26 (30.95%) were either dissatisfied 
or very dissatisfied (Table 3). The average score is 3.07, which indicates that 
respondents as a group were neither particularly satisfied nor dissatisfied 
with the support they received from external sources. 
Table 3 does show that respondents in Arkansas City were relatively 
more satisfied with the assistance they received from external sources than 
those in Augusta; such assistance may be related to the severity of the event. 
Additionally, the dissatisfaction of Augusta respondents with the four se-
lected emergency measures may influence the intensity of their dissatisfac-
tion with the assistance they received from external sources. Respondent 
satisfaction level with four emergency measure is consistent with their 
satisfaction level with the external assistance they received during the post-
flood period (see Tables 2 and 3). 
Satisfaction levels were placed into five categories. Among these 
categories, the external assistance category received the highest average 
rating. This finding is surprising since the amount of assistance received 
accounted for only 26% of the total damage reported by the respondents. It 
implies that the respondents were willing to accept a considerable amount of 
loss from the flooding and knew, or at least were willing to accept, that the 
amount of assistance they would receive from external sources would be 
much less than the damage incurred. For this reason, they were not terribly 
dissatisfied with the disaster relief and aid they received from external 
sources. 
Conclusion 
Results of this study indicate that emergency response measures were 
not implemented in a timely manner, particularly in Augusta. The city 
authorities in Augusta had few hours to prepare, while Arkansas City au-
thorities had more than 24 hours. Since Arkansas City is located about 50 
miles directly south of Augusta, Arkansas City officials knew that flood-
ing would also affect their city. Therefore, those officials closely monitored 
the water levels of the Arkansas and Walnut Rivers. It appears that both 
cities could have been equally prepared, but the short lead time created 
problems for Augusta. There is also a size advantage for Arkansas City. 
Because it is larger than Augusta, Arkansas City had more personnel to 
prepare for the flood. 
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Flood victims in both commumtIes received emergency assistance 
from many sources. Although this assistance amounted to only one-fourth 
of the total losses reported by respondents, their overall satisfaction level 
was higher with the amount of support they received than with the four 
emergency response measures. Various federal agencies took part in the 
recovery and federal assistance played the major role in mitigating hazard 
losses experienced by respondents. 
Preparedness is one of the important determinants of victims' satisfac-
tion with emergency measures undertaken by the concerned authorities in 
the study area. Augusta was less prepared for the 1998 flood compared to 
Arkansas City and thus received lower satisfaction scores from respon-
dents. This is an important finding for both public and private agencies 
involved in predisaster mitigation efforts. This study suggests that respon-
dents' characteristics were not strongly related to their satisfaction levels 
with emergency measures employed by local officials. The findings also 
indicate that the extent of preparedness of a community from a potential 
flood hazard depends on lead time available to public officials and the size 
of the community. 
In order to reduce damage caused by flooding in the future, officials 
need to adopt a comprehensive flash flood watch and advanced warning 
system, and implement a public awareness and preparedness campaign. 
Emergency preparedness officials should also consider conducting emer-
gency drills and/or initiate a flash flood awareness week or month every 
year, which would be beneficial in keeping the risk of flash flooding in the 
public consciousness. 
At the same time, individuals must also act rationally if an emergency 
does arise. Extensive public education may be useful, or even necessary, in 
reducing the tendency to disregard a flash flood watch and/or warning. 
Future research should examine the role of local officials in dealing with the 
risks and uncertainties posed by extreme natural events. Problems con-
fronted by officials in organizing emergency responses to an impending 
natural event may also be an important focus for future study. 
Although results of this study suggest that respondents were not satis-
fied with the emergency response measures undertaken before and/or dur-
ing the flash flood event, no attempt was made to ask respondents why they 
were not satisfied. This study further suggests that the respondents in gen-
eral were not satisfied with most organizations involved in distributing 
disaster assistance among the flood victims. However, many respondents 
greatly appreciated the efforts of several organizations. Instead of seeking 
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overall satisfaction level, future studies should consider respondents' satis-
faction levels with each of the major agencies that participate in dispersing 
disaster relief. Such studies will provide helpful insights to relevant authori-
ties in preparing and managing future flood hazards in small communities. 
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